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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Meier raised several issues on appeal regarding the denial of his motion for
return of property. He has asserted that: (1) the district court applied the incorrect legal
burden with regard to motions in light of the procedural posture of this case; (2) the
district court's findings were not supported by substantial, competent evidence; and (3)
that the district court improperly relieved the State of any burden of proof with regard to
five items of property that were never claimed by any party other than Mr. Meier.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's sole contention in response

- that

Mr. Meier had the initial burden of proof to establish that he was in lawful

possession of the property. The State attempts to create a distinction between the
applicable federal rule and the Idaho rule which, upon a review of pertinent federal case
law analyzing F.R.Cr.P. 41(g) and the history of the rule itself, proves illusory.
In addition, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the State's assertion on
appeal regarding who bore the pertinent burden of proof does not address the failure of
the State to present any evidence at all with regard to any adverse claim of ownership
as to several of the items of property that Mr. Meier was seeking to recover.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Meier's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1

Is there any meaningful distinction between the substantive provisions of I.C.R.
41(e) and its federal counterpart, renumbered at F.R.Cr.P. 41(g), such that this
Court should not consider federal precedent construing motions for return of
property as persuasive precedent in construing the relevant burdens of proof?

2.

Regardless of the respective burdens of proof, does the failure of the State to
present any evidence at all of an adverse claim of ownership to several pieces of
property at issue in Mr. Meier's motion for a return of his property require that
Mr. Meier be returned this property as his is the only claim of lawful ownership to
these items?

ARGUMENT

There Is No Meaninclful Distinction Between The Substantive Provisions Of I.C.R. 41(el
And Its Federal Counterpart, Renumbered At F.R.Cr.P. 4 1 ( ~ )And
,
Therefore This Court
Should Consider Federal Precedent Construina Motions For Return Of Pro~ertvAs
Persuasive Precedent In Construincl The Relevant Burdens Of Proof
In its Respondent's Brief, the State has asserted that federal precedent
apportioning the respective burdens of proof in motions for return of property brought
under the equivalent federal rule should not guide this Court in determining the
applicable legal standards under I.C.R. 41(e). (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The basis
for the State's assertion is a purported distinction between the ldaho rule and the
federal rule -that only the ldaho rule requires that the motion for return of property be
grounded in the assertion that the defendant is entitled to legal possession of the
property, and therefore the federal standards should not govern. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.6-7.) The State's claims, and its legal anaiysis regarding the federal rule governing
motions for return of property, fails for several reasons.
First, the plain language of the I.C.R. 41(e) merely sets forth the grounds that
must be alleged in order to make out a prima facie case for the return of property being
held by the State. In this context, all that is meant by the term "grounds" is the basis for
the legal claim

-

i.e. that the defendant is lawfully entitled to the property.

See

"GROUND," BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY723 (8'h ed. 2004). Once the defendant meets
this initial burden of production so as to demonstrate that he or she has a viable cause
of action, the subsequent allocation of the burden of proof as to the substantive merits
of this claim remains a separate issue. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 146 ldaho 822, 827,
203 P.3d 1221, 1226 (2009) (recognizing statutory scheme in which the State bears

initial threshold burden to justify designation as a sexually violent predator, even though
offender ultimately bore burden of proof in challenging designation); Sfafe v. Lund, 124
ldaho 290, 292, 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1993) (once defendant establishes prima
facie case of a violation of statutory right to speedy trial, burden of proof shifts to the
State to show good cause for the delay).
As previously noted in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Meier has already made out a
prima facie case that he is lawfully entitled to his property because this property was
seized from his possession when it was taken from his storage shed. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.13-14.)

This is consistent with federal case law on the federal counterpart to

I.C.R. 41(e). While the State has attempted to distinguish the ldaho rule from F.R.Cr.P.
41(g), a review of the pertinent case law regarding the federal rule, along with a review
of the text of this rule prior to the 2002 revisions, reveals that there is no significant
substantive difference between these provisions.
As was noted in the Appellant's Brief, former F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) was renumbered in
2002, and its provisions are currently contained in F.R.Cr.P. 41(g). (Appellant's Brief,
p.12 n.6.)

The State correctly notes that the amended version of this rule does not

contain the language requiring a motion for return of property to be made "on the
ground that the person is entitled to lawful possession of the property" that is contained
in I.C.R. 41(e).

See I.C.R. 41(e); F.R.Cr.P. 41(g); Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.

However, the omission of this language from the express terms of the federal rule is
irrelevant because this same requirement that the defendant seek the return of property
based on a threshold showing of legal entitlement is still a requirement under the federal
rule.

Prior to the 2002 amendments to the federal rule, it contained identical language
to the language invoked by the State in an attempt to distinguish these rules. See, e.g.,
Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 165 n.1 (2002) (setting forth the pertinent language of
F.R.Cr.P. 41(e)).' In the Advisory Committee Notes regarding the 2002 amendments,
the Committee makes clear that the renumbering and alterations to the rule were part of
a "general restyling of the Criminal Rules" in order to improve internal clarity and
consistency, and that the changes "were intended to be stylistic only." See F.R.Cr.P. 41
Advisory Committee Note to the 2002 amendments. Therefore, no substantive change
in the provisions of the rule upon renumbering was intended, and therefore the
alterations did not effect any substantive change in what was required in order to make
out a claim under the substance of the federal rule.
Even after the amendments to the federal rule, federal courts interpreted
F.R.Cr.P. 41(g) to require an initial showing of lawful entitlement by the defendant. See,
e.g., Jackson v. U.S., 526 F.3d 394, 396 (athCir. 2008); Ferreira v. U.S., 354 F.Supp.2d
406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, in cases such as the one at issue in this appeal,
where the State has never brought any criminal charges in connection with property
seized from an individual, proof that the property was taken from the defendant's
possession is sufficient to meet this initial burden of production and to shift the burden
of proof to the State to establish that it has a legitimate right to retain the property
because the property is contraband or the fruit of illegal activity. Jackson, 526 F.3d at

This Court may also wish to note that, because former F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) contained
identical language to I.C.R. 41(e), all of the federal case law cited by Mr. Meier in his
Appellant's Brief prior to the 2002 amendments to the federal rule would not be
distinguishable at all on the ground asserted by the State in its Respondent's Brief.

396-397; see also Ensoniq Corp. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 513 (Cal App.
1998) (due process requires that the State establish the property at issue to be stolen or
contraband "in a situation where no charges are pending and no conviction has been
obtained").
Despite the fact that F.R.Cr.P. 41(g) does not contain an express provision in the
language of the rule that a motion for return of property must be made on the ground
that the defendant is legally entitled to the return of the property at issue, this
requirement is, and always has been, a component of the initially required showing by a
defendant under the federal rule.

As such, the State's attempt to distinguish

I.C.R. 41(e) from the federal counterpart to this rule is unavailing.

Renardless Of The Respective Burdens Of Proof. The Failure Of The State To Present
Anv Evidence At All Of An Adverse Claim Of Ownership To Several Pieces Of Property
At Issue In Mr. Meier's Motion For A Return Of His Property Requires That Mr. Meier Be
Returned This Property, As His Is The Onlv Claim Of Lawful Ownership To These Items
As was noted by Mr. Meier in his Appellant's Brief, the State presented no
adverse claim of ownership to five of the items listed in the materials attached to the
Toulouse affidavit. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-20.) The State, in a footnote, has asserted
that it will not address the merits of Mr. Meier's contention regarding the items to which
no other individual claimed a right of possession. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) However,
because there was no other claim of a right of possession made regarding this property
other than that made by Mr. Meier, there was no evidentiary basis upon which the
district court could have concluded that Mr. Meier was not entitled to this property. See,
e.g., Jackson, 516 F.3d at 396-397; Bailey v. U.S., 508 U.S. 736, 739 (!jth Cir. 2007)

(person from whom property is seized is presumed to have a right to its return); U.S. v.
Kaczynski, 416 F.3d 971, 974 (9Ih Cir. 2005).
Idaho Criminal Rule 41(e) mandates that the district court base its decision on
evidence. Specifically, the rule provides that, "The court shall receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision on the motion."

I.C.R. 41(e).

Given that

Mr. Meier was the only party to present any evidence at all that he had a claim of lawful
entitlement to the property omitted from the State's affidavits, the district court had no
evidentiary basis to find against Mr. Meier with regard to these items of property,
regardless of how this Court allocates the respective burden of proof.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Meier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 13'~day of October, 2009.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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